The Court in Terry realized that in certain situations intrusions of a lesser nature than an arrest were necessary for the well-being of the public and the police officer. 18 Since the intrusions were less severe than an arrest, the standard to justify them could be less demanding than probable cause.'
9
A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has evolved into the lesser standard. This le-ser standard is now denoted by the phrase "a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." The standard is based on two sources of information that when added together must cause a reasonable man to believe that the action taken was proper:
2° I) the "specific and articulable facts" known to the officer, and 2) any inferences the officer could reasonably draw from those facts in light of his experience as an officer.
2 ' The scope of the intrusion is limited by the justification produced by the initial determination of reasonableness. S. 606, 616 (1977) ; and searches or seizures while in hot pursuit, see Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24. '9The Court recognized that the fourth amendment extended to ensure the privacy of persons on the street from unreasonable intrusions by government agents.,Id. at 9. However, because often it would be impractical or impossible for an officer reacting to.spontaneous situaiions on the street to obtain a warrant, and because many of the encounters on the street were of a lesser nature tot requiring a warrant, such actions by an officer were not to be judged by the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Instead, they were to be judged by the reasonableness of the action. Id. at 20. 21 Id. at 21. This standard is applied to the two tiers: the initial intrusion and the scope of the intrusion, both recognized in Terry.
2 Id. at 21. The officer in Terry was justified in frisking the individual when he had reason to believe the individual was armed and dangerous. The justification was safety of the officer and the public. The scope of the intrusion was limited to a patting of the outer clothing for weapons. Id. at 28-30.
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II. UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL
Sylvia Mendenhall landed at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport to switch planes on her flight from Los Angeles to Pittsburgh. She was the last passenger off the plane. Two DEA agents watched her scan the terminal and then proceed slowly to the baggage area. Instead of claiming any baggage, she asked an airline employee for the location of the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. She then proceeded to that counter to pick up her boarding pass for her flight to Pittsburgh. 23 As Mendenhall walked through the terminal the agents approached her, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked her for some identification. She gave them her driver's license, but the name on it did not match the name on her airline ticket. She gave them no explanation other than that she felt like using another name. She also told the agents, upon questioning, that she had been in Los Angeles two days.
One agent then identified himself as a federal narcotics agent, at which point Mendenhall appeared to become quite nervous. After returning the license and the ticket, the agent asked Mendenhall if she would accompany him to the DEA office in the airport. She did so.U At the DEA office the agent asked her if she would consent to a search of her purse and her person, and told her that she could refuse. She said, "Go ahead." A female officer arrived to conduct the body search. She too asked Mendenhall if she consented and told her again that she could refuse. Mendenhall still consented. The officer then told her to remove her clothes. Mendenhall hesitated and mentioned that she had a plane to catch. When the officer assured her that she would make the flight if the search turned up no narcotics, she began to undress, and removed heroin from her undergarments.2
Mendenhall was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 26 The district court denied 23 The dissent indicates that Mendenhall went to the Eastern counter to pick up her boarding pass, not to buy a new ticket. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887.
2' The record provided no indication of her consent, only that she had gone with the agents. Id. at 1874.
"Id. at 1873-74. 2 Although the Court does not set out the specific statute under which the respondent was convicted, the applicable statute is probably 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970): "(a) except as authorized by this subchapter, it will be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance; .... " her motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the body search as the product of an unlawful search and seizure. 27 It concluded that the agents' approach constituted a valid investigatory stop, that the respondent voluntarily went to the DEA office with the agents so that no arrest occurred at that time, and that respondent had consented to the search.ss
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, based solely on its prior decision in United States v. McCaleb,29 a factually similar case.3° A rehearing en banc resulted in the same conclusion.
1
Justice Stewart wrote the five-member majority opinion reversing the court of appeals' decision. AMcording to him, three issues were presented for determination: whether the initial stop of Mendenhall by the agents constituted a seizure, whether Mendenhall voluntarily consented to accompany the agents to their office, and whether Mendenhall freely and voluntarily consented to the body search.
2
The majority of the Court upheld the initial stop as valid, but for different reasons. For Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, the stop did not constitute a seizure, so the determination of reasonable sus-2 The district court's opinion has not been reported. 28 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1874. 9 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), rehearing en banc, 556 F.2d 385 (1977) . In McCaleb, the court held that reasonable suspicion to stop was not present when the only information upon which the stop was based was the comparison of defendant's behavior with the drug courier profile. Id. at 720. It also held that asking the defendant to accompany the agents to the DEA office constituted an arrest. Id. Finally, the court ruled the consent invalid because it was the "fruit" of an unconstitutional detention. Id. at 721.
For cases holding that in such a situation no arrest occurred, see United States v. Chapman, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977 How long is brief? Most courts do not set a time limit. However, often it is viewed as the amount of time it takes for identification and an explanation for the suspicious behavior. Van Sicklen, Terry Revisited: Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk Developments, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 877, 877 n.1, reprinted in 1 CRIM. L. REv. 147 (1979) .
For a case allowing a "brief" detention of two hours, see United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1954 .
The American Law Institute has set twenty minutes as the time limit for a stop not requiring probable cause or consent. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-CEDURE § 110.2(1) at 5. consent was the product of earlier conduct by the agents which violated the fourth amendment. [O] bviously not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Prior to the note, the Court had already recognized that police-citizen encounters are "inherently rich in diversity," ranging from friendly conversations to hostile confrontations. Id. at 13.
Many such encounters are susceptible to abuse. These are known as "aggressive preventive patrol" and include 1) vice control practices, 2) weapons confiscation, 3) control of gangs and juveniles, 4) disturbance control, 5) control of public drinking, 6) traffic control. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 39, 61-62 (1968 The discussion provides an example of the balancing process that determines reasonableness. Justice Stewart concluded that it was reasonable not to view all intrusions as seizures because to do so would harm societal interests without concurrently increasing protection of individual liberty. In other words, the trade off or compromise was negative; society lost, but the individual did not gain.
For a general discussion of the inappropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule to investigatory stops because other police citizen encounters can be abusive, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12-15.
Other encounters where it is reasonable for an officer to stop the individual without probable cause include: individual matches an informant's tip, individual matches general description provided by a victim or 'seized' within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave." ' 0
A reasonable belief could arise however, without the individual being physically restrained from leaving. Justice Stewart provided several examples of a seizure without physical restraint, including the presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, the officer touching the individual, or the officer using certain language or a tone of voice indicating a demand for compliance.
5
' He compared these examples to the facts of the case to conclude that there was no reason for the respondent to believe that she was not free to leave when approached by the DEA agents. Justice Stewart relied upon the following factors to support his conclusion that there was not a seizure: the approach occurred in a public place, the agents approached the respondent rather than summoning her to them, the agents did not demand, but requested to see respondent's license and plane ticket. The respondent was not seized just because she provided her ticket and license to the agents, nor because the person doing the asking was a federal agent. ' 412 U.S. 218 (1973 hether a consent ... was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. her ticket and license had been returned prior to being asked carried the day for the government. 6 Demographic factors such as age, education, and race, tending to invalidate consent, were relevant, but not determinative. 64 Finally, the majority turned to the last issuethe consensual body search. As with the previous issue, the discussion was brief. Initially, Justice Stewart noted that because the seizure was lawful, it could not have tainted Mendenhall's consent.
65
He cited several reasons for finding that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.
66 One was Mendenhall's age and education. 67 Another was the fact that Mendenhall had been told twice by the very people who were asking her consent that she did not have to consent. 6 8 Third, Mendenhall had 6 "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was in fact freely and voluntarily given." Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548.
64 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1879. The consent was not coerced simply because respondent was twenty-two, black, female, and a high school dropout confronted by two white male federal agents. as United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
66 Id. at 1879-80.
67 Id. at 1879. She was twenty-two and had an eleventh grade education.
68 Id. Even though knowledge of the right to refuse was not the sine qua non of consent, the Court based its decision upon that knowledge, especially since it was provided by those seeking the consent. One wonders how effective such information is when it comes from the very party seeking consent. Even Justice Stewart admitted that such things as language used and tone of voice can be coercive. 100 S. Ct. 1277-78. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
Such warnings have been argued as the answer to this problem. See ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRF-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1(2), at 3; § 240.2(2), at 149, 261 & n. 10, 533-35; LaFave, supra note 45, at 96-99. LaFave set out the differences between field interrogations and station house interrogations. At the station house one is cut off from the outside world in unfamiliar surroundings, subjected to longer interrogations, and faced with the [Vol. 71 already unequivocally consented not once, but twice. Fourth, the statement that she had a plane to catch was not relevant, being merely an expression of concern for time. 6 9 Fifth, Mendenhall did undress when assured she would catch her flight if the search did not uncover narcotics. 70 Finally, the atmosphere of a DEA office itself was not inherently coercive.
7
Because the lower courts had assumed the initial stop to be a seizure, the remaining Justices in the majority 72 did not discuss the issue. 73 Instead Justice Powell, writing for the three, also assumed the stop to be a seizure, and concluded that it had been reasonable under the fourth amendment. 4 He weighed the public interest in the seizure, i.e., stemming the flow of deadly drugs by organized crime, 7 5 the nature and the psychological scope of josSIIliq of physical abuse, subterfuge, or wholesale arrests so that by chance a confession will be obtained. However, Justice Powell made clear that he did not necessarily disagree with Justice Stewart's analysis of the encounter-seizure dichotomy. This was not the proper time to apply it, nor was he sure that, even under the standard set out by Justice Stewart, no seizure had occurred. Id. at 1880 n.l.
74 Id. at 1880. The petitioner claimed that the stop was reasonable because it was analogous to United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) . The government claimed the facts that led to the reasonable suspicion in Brignoni-Ponce had counterparts in Mendenhall. The source city was similar to the characteristics of the area; respondent's scanning the terminal, flight arrangements, and nervousness matched the driver's behavior, the absence of luggage could be considered like the aspects of the auto, and the factors present fit only a small number of passengers, unlike in Brignoni-Ponce where all individuals of Mexican heritage were suspect. 77 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1882. Justice Powell cited four factors: 1) the agent's knowledge of the methods used recently by criminals, 2) the characteristics of persons engaged in criminal activity, 3) the characteristics of the area, and 4) the behavior of the individual, especially if he appeared to be trying to avoid police contact. The fact that the respondent appeared nervous, appeared to be trying to evade detection, got off the plane last, scanned the area, walked slowly to the baggage area, failed to claim any luggage, and obtained a pass for another airline, provided the agents with reason to stop the respondent. Id' Justice Powell seemed willing to defer to the agent's expertise. First, he took cognizance of the fact that they were trained to observe things that appear innocent to the untrained. Second, this particular agent had ten years experience and had been involved in over 100 arrests in drug related incidents in the past year at the airport. Finally, the agents are part of a "well defined, effective, federal law-enforcement program." Id. at 1882-83.
78 Id. at 1883.
id.
0 Id. at 1884. The majority and the dissent borrowed from a footnote in Terry to establish their position. " [T] he sounder course is to recognize that the fourth amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of a particular intrusion in light of all the exigencies of the case a central element in the analysis of reasonableness." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15.
At least one author believes that Adams supports this view. "Adams recognized that any on the street investigatory stop by the police inevitably involved a restraint on the citizen's freedom to walk away and therefore is subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness re-if not all intrusions are seizures this intrusion certainly was. He carefully pointed out that the government failed to argue below that the stop was not a seizure, but rather argued that the seizure was reasonable. 8 Holding that there was a seizure, the dissent concluded that the agents did not have specific and articulable facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The only facts available were obtained by observing the respondent at the airport. 8 9 Nothing in her behavior provided a basis for reasonable suspicion. 9 0 If anything, her conduct should have negated any suspicion that the agents might have had.
a 1 Also, the dissent was not impressed with Justice Powell's faith in the success of the DEA plan.9 Finally, the dissent maintained that even if there was no seizure up to that point, a seizure occurred when Mendenhall accompanied the agents to the DEA office. Based upon Dunaway v. New York, 53 8' The concurrence relied on more than the facts available from observing the respondent. Policy considerations were important to Justice Powell.
9 The dissent maintained that the facts relied upon for reasonable suspicion were irrelevant. The fact that Mendenhall came from a source city was not as incriminating as associating with narcotic addicts, but the latter does not support a seizure. 100 S. Ct. at 1886 n.8; see Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) . Mendenhall's failure to pick up any luggage was explained by the flight change. The agent knew that Mendenhall was switching flights prior to stopping her, and admitted that he did not believe the lack of luggage was therefore suspicious. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887 n.9. Nor would Mendenhall getting off the plane last or walking slowly provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1886.
91 Id. at 1886-87. The Court had previously recognized, and reaffirmed as recently as Brown v. Texas, 433 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2 (1979) , that an experienced police officer trained in a particular field can recognize suspicious behavior in conduct that to most people would appear to be innocent. The dissent believed that likewise there could be behavior that appeared suspicious to the casual observer, but should appear innocent to the trained, experienced agent. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887 n.10.
The dissent seemed to be holding the agents to a higher standard of reasonable suspicion due to their experience and training. This would be consistent with the Terry analysis of reasonable inferences drawn in light of the officer's experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.
9 The dissent noted Justice Powell's reliance on the success of the DEA program in finding reasonable suspicion. However, to them it was not so clear that the success of the program was built on "nearly-random" stops. The success was attributable to numerous factors including: information from ticket agents, independent police work, and occasional tips. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887 n.l1. 9 442 U.S. 200 (1979) . In Dunaway, the Court ruled that a person who had accompanied the police to the station house had been seized and that the applicable standard was probable cause.
The government distinguished Dunaway. Mendenhall had aroused suspicion, and the agents knew they had to [Vol. 71
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Mendenhall's going to the office constituted a seizure akin to an arrest.9 That being the case, probable cause was required before ordering Mendenhall to the office. Besides, the record did not show that Mendenhall actually consented to go to the office, only that sheqid go. Since mere acquiescence" 5 or an absence f proof of resistance is not enough to prove consent,r the government did not carry its burden.
97
Mendenhall's consent to the search of her person was dealt with in one sentence. All evidence should have been suppressed because it was tainted by the previous illegal detainment.98
III. HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
STANDARD
The authors of each opinion placed the case within the framework of Terry v. Ohio. In that case the Court first recognized that the fourth amendment protects citizens from police activity, such as a stop and frisk, even though such activity is less intrusive than arrests and searches.99 The reasonaact quickly or lose the suspect. They approached her in a public place, asked her a few questions, and then asked her to the office. This was all very brief. Brief for Petitioner at 58-59, United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
94 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1888. The government listed four reasons showing that it was reasonable to ask Mendenhall to accompany the agents to the DEA office. One was a safety factor-by asking the respondent to go the DEA office the agents decreased any danger to themselves and the public from confidants of the respondent. Another reason was practical-the conversation was more easily understood away from the noise. The third reason was important to the future success of the program. The agents did not want to attract undue attention to themselves by remaining in the concourse. Finally, retiring to the office would prevent unnecessary embarrassment to Mendenhall. Arguably, the balancing approach that began with Camara and was adopted by Terry and its progeny is really no different than the basic analysis of whether probable cause exists. Probable cause exists when all the factors are weighed and it is determined that a crime has been committed and that the suspect more probably than not was involved.
One author views reasonable suspicion as being no different in form than probable cause. It is an objective analysis as is probable cause and will come to be no more vague than probable cause once it has been interpreted in a number of cases. The difference between the two standards may be no more than the degree of probability that must be present to satisfy each. LaFave, supra note 45, at 68-73. "The permissible grounds for a stop can be made just as precise as the grounds for arrest; and, the permissible grounds for a stopping can be set forth in objective terms." Id. at 84. Probable cause represents a compromise between preventing crime and insuring individual privacy. Balancing represents the means to the compromise. Probable cause has been set as the minimum standard to justify arrests and searches. Id. at 54, 57. The Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924) , concluded that the substance of all the definitions of probable cause was a "reasonable ground for belief in guilt." This is not much different from a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The Court-recently reaffirmed these same sentiments.
examining police-citizen encounters: first it determined the justification for the intrusion,' 0 ' then it determined whether the scope of the intrusion had exceeded its initial justification.' 0 2
The Three reasons for not extending the standard are provided by one recent work on search and seizure. One reason to limit the standard to violent crimes is that the necessity for immediate action (a factor in the Terry Court's reasoning) is not as great with minor and nonviin the watering down of the fourth amendment rights by the "hydraulic pressures" of our time, symbolized by the abandonment of the strict application of probable cause for searches and seizures. 0 7 In light of the development of the reasonable suspicion standard and its application in contexts other than violent crimes, Justice Douglas' fears, although possibly overstated, were neither misplaced nor unfounded. The use of the reasonable suspicion standard by the Supreme Court and the lower courts indeed has gone beyond its expected application.'0s The case that followed Terry, Adams v. Williams, 1 0 limolent crimes. Second, if investigatory stops are limited to only violent crimes there will be less public resentment because it will be easier to see the justification in relation to violent crimes. Finally, such a limit will decrease the opportunities for abuse-fishing expeditions for evidence will be severely restricted. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 27. See Caracappa, supra note 80, at 510.
As the number of stops increases so does the hostility of the community toward the police. ALI MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 at 262 (1975).
107 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 37. Justice Douglas felt strongly that to move away from probable cause, which provided certainty and was deeply rooted in our history, would give the police more power than the magistrate, leading inevitably to totalitarianism. Such a choice should be made by the people, not the Court.
Some writers view investigatory seizures as a means of circumventing probable cause requirements and believe that the exercise of power unlimited by probable cause will become the exercise of arbitrary power. See Caracappa, supra note 80, at '09 407 U.S. at 147. A policeman approached the respondent in a high-crime area late at night. Respondent was seated in a car. The officer asked him to get out of the car. His response was to roll down the window. When he did so the officer reached in and grabbed respondent's gun. The officer acted solely on the tip. He had not observed any suspicious behavior, nor prior to seizing the gun had the officer asked to see respondent's permit to carry a gun (Connecticut allowed the carrying of a handgun with a permit). Also there was some question as to the informant's reliability, id. at 156-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a general overview of the argument against the majority's holding, see Miles, supra note 99, at 138-39.
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ited the application of the standard to violent crimes," but allowed the officer's reasonable suspicion to be based solely on an informant's tip. ' Neither officer safety nor violent crimes were involved in the next group of cases involving stops of automobiles. In one, the Court required the border patrol to have a reasonable suspicion that the car stopped was carrying illegal aliens.
1 1 2 In the next case, not even reasonable suspicion was required for the border patrol to set up a road block to check all cars for illegal aliens."
3
The decisions in the lower federal courts provide other examples of expansion. Like the Supreme Court, these courts have based decisions to allow intrusions on general policy considerations rather than the particularized circumstances of a given situation." 4 Also, police activity of a less intrusive nature than a stop and frisk has been approved on a standard less exacting than reasonable suspicion." 1 The officer had no observation from which to draw in establishing articulable facts or reasonable inferences. Further, even with the information obtained, the officer had no reason to believe the suspect was dangerous.
12 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. The Court balanced the public's interest in keeping illegal aliens out of the country because of the economic costs and social problems they cause, id. at 878, against the modest intrusion of stopping the vehicle and asking a few questions, id. at 879-90. Significantly the Court broke away from the violent crimes limitation; no attempt was made to justify the stop on that basis.
However, any intrusion that went beyond the initial questions required probable cause or consent of the individual. Id. at 882-83.
It has been maintained that Brignoni-Ponce increased the protection afforded minorities against intrusions on their privacy. The Court's reasonable suspicion standard replaced the patrolman's reliance on race as the determining factor in stopping a vehicle. Van Sicklen; supra note 40, at 157 n.6.
11 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) . Brigoni-Ponce was distinguished. Id. at 577-60.
For another case where a general concern outweighed the cases's particularized factual situation, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (officer's safety was the general concern). The Court upheld the authority of an officer to order the occupants of an auto stopped for a traffic violation to step out of the car. 14 
IV. THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD IN
MENDENHALL
The Mendenhall Court spent much time on the issue of whether the initial stop was a seizure, even though seven of the Justices believed that the issue did not warrant a decision by the Court. 2 4 The
Justices apparently believed that they were staking out positions on the issue, but upon examination the actual positions are not clear. A majority of the Justices appear to accept the Stewart standard of "a reasonable belief that one is not free to leave" to be the basis for determining when a stop constitutes a seizure.12 Justice Stewart, while asserting that not all stops are seizures, failed to delineate between informational stops and investigatory stops. This approach to the seizure question is simplistic. A situation where a citizen stopped by an officer would reasonably believe himself free to turn and walk away, ignoring any question put to him, is difficult to visualize. Likewise, it is unclear how Mendenhall could reasonably have believed she was free to leave and thus avoid the agent's questions when she was approached by him and asked for items without questions would be allowed during a stop based on reasonable suspicion, otherwise probable cause or consent was required. Two, Terry was the exception and not the rule. Three, custodial interrogations were more like arrests than investigatory stops. Id. at 211-12. To apply the reasonable suspicion standard would cause the exception to swallow the rule. Id. at 212. 122 443 U.S. 47 (1979) . '23 The Court examined Terry and its progeny, followed their analysis, and determined that the facts were not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the stop. Even though the area was a high-crime area, it was late at night, the police saw the petitioner approach another man in an alley but avoid him when he saw the police, and the petitioner refused to give his name to the police. The Court ruled that suspicion was not reasonable. Id. at 51-52.
124 See note 74 supra.
125 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, 1881 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Although the concurrence was not dissatisfied with the standard set forth, it did not actually accept the standard or apply it in Mendenhall. which he would not leave. Although Justice Stewart notes that the police have the same right as any ordinary citizen to ask questions of anyone they meet, being questioned by a stranger in a public place is different from being questioned by a stranger who identifies himself as a federal agent. The former can be ignored if one desires, but who can reasonably believe he is free to ignore the questions of an officer when that officer has made a point of stopping the individual? Every stop by an identified officer should constitute a seizure under the Stewart standard. The officer has used his authority to restrain the individual's freedom of action, 126 and the individual could not reasonably believe himself to be free to leave. Justice Stewart distinquished the auto cases, maintaining that every pedestrian stopped was not seized just because the Court had previously held that every time a vehicle was stopped it was seized. He believed the intrusion to be greater in the latter case. The difference in the two situations, however, is not so obvious. In both, the officer by some show of authority has halted the movement and restricted the freedom of the detainee1 27 The only difference is that one detainee is in a car and the other is on foot. The framers of the fourth amendment surely could not have intended to favor the driver over the pedestrian. Justice Stewart also distinquished Brown v. Texas.
126 This is part of Justice Stewart's test. See United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
127 There is some doubt regarding one's psychological ability to voluntarily consent in such a situation. It is a "sociological reality that most individuals submit to a police officer's authority." Only one reason is based on a wish to voluntarily cooperate. Fear of the police and a belief that noncooperation will lead to arrest are two other major reasons. See Note, supra note 114, at 901 n.30
The Court in Prouse (one of the auto ,cases distinguished) gave four reasons for requiring the officer to have a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation before stopping the auto. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. The four reasons the Court put forth apply equally to the stop of a pedestrian. The officer has interfered with one's freedom of movement whether he stops an auto or a pedestrian. The stop takes the time of both the driver and the pedestrian. Anxiety over being approached by an officer occurs in either case, whether one is involved :n innocent or criminal conduct. Finally, when an officer pulls an auto over, a show of authority is required. The same is true for the pedestrian. Lights may not flash nor sirens screech, but the agent identifies himself as a law officer. This establishes his authority to stop the individual and ask him some questions. The identification serves the purpose of preventing the individual from reacting as he would normally to a stranger who was pestering him with questions or intruding upon his privacy.
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The Brown Court viewed the stop of a pedestrian to ascertain his identity to be a seizure."ss Justice Stewart believed that no seizure occurred in Brown until Brown was frisked over his protest. 2 s But the Brown opinion seems to indicate that a seizure occurred when Brown was stopped. Mendenhall, too, was stopped for identification. Even though Mendenhall provided identification and Brown did not, that would not be a distinguishing factor on the stop issue. There is no distinguishing feature. Both were stopped while walking in public places by officers for identification purposes. If one case requires reasonable suspicion, should not the other?
The dissent applied Stewart's standard, without accepting it, to show that no reasonable suspicion existed,as yet it proposed no alternative standard. At one point the dissent indicated that all stops of citizens by the police are seizures.
13
' However, Justice White had recognized in Terry that not all street encounters are seizures.1 3 2 Whether Justice White actually meant in Mendenhall that all stops, or only stops for investigative purposes, constitute seizures is never explicitly made clear.
What is more puzzling about the dissent is its view of the standard applicable to the seizure. Justice White's analysis was based on the reasonable suspicion standard, 1 33 but he wrote at times as 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). Also, all four of the dissenters were in the majority in Dunaway when the Court refused to adopt a "multifactor balancing test" to determine "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" to cover all seizures that are less intrusive than an arrest. The majority felt that such a notion, balancing each situation, would destroy the protections intended by the framers in the fourth amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213.
The majority went on to clarify its position against a sliding scale test. "A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." Id. at 213-14.
In a concurrence Justice White maintained that the key to the fourth amendment was not probable cause, but balancing. "[I]f courts and law enforcement officers are to have workable rules ... this balancing must in large part be done on a categorical basis-not on an ad hoc, case by case fashion by individual police officers." Id. at 214 (White, J., concurring).
's3 United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1887. The dissent impliedly recognizes the question of a seizure as an issue. See note 89 supra. If they recognize the issue then they must not mean that all stops are seizures, because if all stops are seizures, there would be no issue.
if he were willing to abandon a blanket reasonable suspicion standard and institute a case-by-case balancing approach.1 a4 The danger of this approach is that it lowers the requisite factual standard which separates privacy from intrusion. Not only would some intrusions require less of a factual basis, but no consistent standard would govern intrusions short of a custodial search.1
35 Each court hearing a case involving a lesser police intrusion would have the freedom to set its own standard. Police would have no standard to govern their conduct, and citizens would not know what protections they had until a court ruled on the point.
The Court is faced with a dilemma in determining when a stop is a seizure. The majority position, while seeming to give officers more latitude in dealing with crime, may actually restrict an officer's options if reasonable suspicion is required every time an individual submits to official authority by stopping. Conversely, the language used by the dissent, despite its intent to expand the protections of the fourth amendment, provides a basis for opening individual privacy to intrusions based on less than a reasonable suspicion. The controversy surrounding the fourth amendment centers on the tension between society's need for effective crime control and an individual's right to privacy. Borrowing from each of the positions taken by the Court might provide a beneficial compromise to this tension-it should establish an investigational purpose test. The Court should recognize the difference between stopping an individual for information to aid an investigation, and stopping an individual for the purpose of investigating that individual.
13 7 The latter clearly is more intrusive because the individual by his own words or deeds could incriminate himself, while in the former case the individual is surrendering information that would indirectly benefit him as a member of society. Whenever an officer stops an individual to investigate him, rather than to inquire about an occurrence or another person, the officer should be required to have a reasonable as The Court could solve the problem by requiring a reasonable suspicion to exist any time a stop led to the production of evidence that could be used against the individual stopped. This requirement seems to coincide with an individual's reasonable expectation of freedom from any intrusion that causes divulgence of selfincriminating information. This standard would not be based on the officer's subjective intent; the only relevant fact would be the information or evidence gained by the stop. This would involve hindsight, but at least the standard would be based on the articulable facts and reasonable inferences known to the officer prior to the stop, and would thus protect individual privacy.
The Stewart position does not provide this protection. If an individual does not heed an officer's approach, but continues on his way, there is no seizure problem because there has been no intrusion. Similarly, if the individual attempts to continue on his way and the officer acts to stop him, a seizure has occurred. The problem arises when the individual stops upon initiation of a conversation without the officer doing anything other than identifying himself. Under Justice Stewart's interpretation this is not a seizure, but the officer, by observing the individual and using information gained from the conversation, could develop reasonable suspicion to "seize," or even probable cause to arrest the individual. By merely stopping for an officer's question, the individual allows his actions and knowledge to be subjected to a form of "search" without the officer having to justify the initial intrusion. Justice Stewart treats this as if the individual has consented to the "search" by stopping. 19The fourth amendment requires "that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implict means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion is applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228.
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and silent deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
stopping when approached by an officer, some threshold is required to safeguard individual privacy. The proposed investigational purpose test would require reasonable suspicion for the officer to obtain evidence from a person that could actually be used against him. If, however, the only information gained was not incriminating, then reasonable suspicion would not be required for the stop. The police would retain flexibility in the information gathering process.
Justice Powell's concurrence focuses more on the reasonable search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment than on the Terry reasonable suspicion standard.
14° Although he did hold that a "reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity" existed to justify stopping Mendenhall, he did not rely solely on the facts known to the agents, nor on their inferences in reaching his conclusion.1 4t The need for a highly trained experienced group of agents acting within a well-defined plan to limit the trafficking of deadly drugs was important to him, indeed overshadowing the particular situation.
42 Such acquiescence to police skills, although arguably opening the way for more intrusions, may in fact better protect the individual from governmental intrusion of a more restrictive nature. To this end balancing the public interest against the right to be free from intrusion and to protect one's reasonable expectation of privacy from arbitrary intrusions the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular interest, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51.
'43 Probable cause may in fact be strenghtened by the adoption of an additional lesser standard. The standard previously was watered down to encompass a lesser standard. This watered down standard in turn was applied to arrests and searches. [Vol. 71
AIRPORT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Justice Powell impliedly establishes two restrictions in addition to requiring reasonable suspicion: a major national problem'" and an artfully crafted plan to solve the problem.
The discussion of the consent issue was anticlimactic. 145 The majority contended that Mendenhall had accompanied the agents to their office and had consented twice to a body search while being informed that she did not have to consent. The weakness in the majority position is that the agents did not inform Mendenhall that she was free to decline to go to the office. Why did the agents wait until Mendenhall was in the DEA office before telling her she could refuse to consent?1 4 6 It is not clear why the majority should place so much reliance on Mendenhall being informed that she did not have to consent to the body search but overlook the lack of informed consent at the initial stop.' 47 Also, the Court seemed to grant a broad interpretation to what Mendenhall consented to when she accompanied the agents to the office. The agent asked her if she was willing to go to the DEA office for further questioning.'8 He did not ask her if she would accompany the agents to the office for a search of her purse and her person. Even if one can voluntarily consent without knowing that he is free to refuse, one must surely know first what is being requested. Yet, the Court accepts as sufficient the fact that Mendenhall consented merely to accompany the agents.
Finally, Mendenhall represented the first time the Court had considered the drug courier profile 149 as '"The Court has been concerned with issues of na- The profile of the New Orleans airport is made up of: 1) unusual nervousness, 2) limited or no luggage, 3) carrying a large sum of cash in small denominations, 4) an itinerary that includes circuitous routes from major drug source cities, 5) arriving from a source city, 6) paying for the ticket in small currency, 7) one way tickets, 8) use of an alias, 9) using a false telephone number on a flight reservation, 10) placing a call immediately on arrival, 11) travel by a known trafficker. United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978) .
At La Guardia in New York City the profile includes: 1) the passenger is not carrying luggage, 2) the passenger attempts to immediately leave the airport, 3) nervousness, suspicion.
51 Finally and most importantly, the concurrence relied on more than the drug courier profile to determine that the seizure was reasona- Justice Rehnquist dissented along two lines. He believed the conduct of the agent in stopping Reid and obtaining his consent did not fall under fourth amendment protections. 16 7 VI. ANALYSIS Reid reaffirmed the application of the standard of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stops based on the belief that the individual stopped is carrying narcotics. The Court again applied the Terry analysis. It looked to the articulable facts and the officer's inferences to determine if a basis for reasonable suspicion existed. The suspicion of criminal activity was not reasonable.
The difference in the decisions in Reid and Mendenhall is hard to explain. In each case the Court applied the same Terry analysis to similar facts. 16 s Mendenhall and Reid both arrived in the early morning from a city known as a major source of narcotics for the area in which each landed. Both had stayed only a short time in that city. Neither picked up any luggage, and both appeared to be avoiding detection. Both were stopped by agents, and appeared nervous during the questioning. Also, both "agreed" to accompany the agents without being told they could decline to do so. Not only were the facts almost identical, but the same social concern and the same well-defined plan to deal with the concern were present.
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Although the drug courier profile differs 17° at each airport, the Court did not distinguish the cases based on an inadequacy in the profile of the Atlanta airport. The profile does not appear to be the distinguishing factor. Indeed, the Court provided no distinguishing factor at all between Reid and Mendenhall. 170 See note 150 supra. 171 Justice Powell maintained in Mendenhall that neiActually, labeling the entire Court as inconsistent is not fair. A majority of the Court remained true to the positions they took in Mendenhall. Justice Rehnquist continued to believe that no seizure had occurred. Also, the dissenters in Mendenhall who could find no reasonable suspicion on those facts consistently found no reasonable suspicion in Reid. The baffling change in view came from theJustices making up the concurrence in both cases, and Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Mendenhall.
The per curiam opinion assumed that the stop was a seizure. The investigational purpose test would have provided the same result, but based on more than an assumption. The test presumes any stop is a seizure when it produces evidence that will be used against the individual stopped. Cocaine found in the abandoned suitcase was obtained from the stop of Reid and used to convict him. The stop was therefore a seizure.
Once it is determined that the stop was a seizure, the next step is to determine if the seizure was reasonable. The basis for such a determination is the articulable facts and reasonable inferences available to the officer prior to the stop. The Court concluded on this basis that the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Reid.
The investigational purpose test does not assume all stops to be seizures. It protects individual privacy by requiring reasonable suspicion prior to a stop which produces evidence used against the person stopped, and by disallowing its development during the stop. The test eliminates involuntary "consent" stops without eliminating police flexibility in information gathering.
Reid and Mendenhall are different in one respect. Mendenhall "consented" to the search that produced the evidence, whereas Reid did not consent to having his bag checked, attempting instead to escape. Reid's behavior prior to reaching the DEA office was actually more suspicious than Mendenhall's. Yet Mendenhall's conviction, rather than Reid's, was upheld. This highlights Mendenhall's subsequent consent as the actual distinguishing factor, but does not clarify the Court's analysis of reasonable suspicion. If Mendenhall's consent was the distinguishing feature, then it is no longer clear that the Court followed the Terry analysis which requires a decision on the issue of reasonable suspicion first. Alternatively if reasonable suspicion "ther the success of the program nor the profile were determinative-each case must be decided on its own facts. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1883 n.8.
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